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Abstract
We test for the presence of interest rate smoothing in forward looking Taylor rules in ﬁrst differences.We also
consider ﬁnancial and asymmetric preferences indicators. We ﬁnd that interest rate smoothing is not induced by
an omitted variable bias.
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1   . Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that Central Bankers have historically implemented a smooth
monetary policy rate. A large number of papers have investigated the rationale for this Central
1 Bankers’ gradualism . Nevertheless, in a recent contribution Rudebusch (2002) claims that the
monetary policy inertia at quarterly frequencies is just an illusion. He supports his claim with an
indirect proof based on the term structure of interest rates. He also performs a direct test on the partial
adjustment (i.e. interest rate smoothing) versus serial correlation hypotheses with a nested model in
levels. However, this direct investigation does not lead to a deﬁnitive conclusion. This is due to an
2 observational equivalence problem affecting the analysis performed with variables in levels . In this
case, a policy rate path triggered by a pure partial adjustment process with white noise errors is very
*Tel.: 139-0349-142-5415; fax: 139-0341-42-1795.
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1See recent surveys by Sack and Wieland (2000) and Srour (2001).
2See Castelnuovo (2003) for some numerical simulations regarding this problem.
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similar to the one implied by a Taylor rule without interest rate smoothing but with serially correlated
policy shocks.
Interestingly, English et al. (2002, ENS hereafter) notice how this observational equivalence
problem may be overcome with a model in ﬁrst differences. The advantage of the latter is to give
clear indications both in the case of a rejection of the null hypothesis and in the alternative one.
In this paper, we test for the presence of interest rate smoothing at quarterly frequencies in forward
` looking Taylor rules. To do so, we employ a model in ﬁrst differences a la ENS. In our exercise, we
generalize their approach. In particular, we consider a larger set of Taylor rates, taking into account
also potentially important omitted variables such as the quadratic output gap and the credit spread.
Our aim is to understand if the persistence of the federal funds rate typically registered in these kinds
of empirical exercises is spurious and due to an omitted variable problem. Our results support the
interest rate smoothing hypothesis.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents ENS’s empirical model. In the same section
we explain how we take into account the potentially important omitted variables listed above. Section
3 describes the data. In Section 4 we analyze our empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2   . The framework
In the context of simple Taylor (1993) rules, we identify a partial adjustment process with the
following model:
˜ i 5(12r)i 1ri 1h (1) tt t 21 t
˜ where i is the federal funds rate, r is the smoothing parameter, i is the Taylor rate, and h is a white t tt
noise process. Instead, the serial correlation speciﬁcation reads as follows:
˜ i 5i 1´ , ´ 5r´ 1h (2) ttt t´ t21 t
where ´ is an AR(1) process, deﬁned by the coefﬁcient r . t ´
ENS notice that while the two different speciﬁcations (1) and (2) have similar implications for the
behavior of the interest rate level, this similarity does not hold anymore when ﬁrst differences are
taken into account. To see this, consider Eq. (1). After some algebra, it is possible to arrive at the
following formulation:
˜˜ Di 5(12r) Di 1(12r)(i 2i )1h (3) tt t 21 t21 t
By contrast, the serial correlation speciﬁcation (2) leads to this alternative equation:
˜˜ Di 5Di 1(12r )(i 2i )1h (4) tt ´ t21 t21 t
Then, we can estimate the empirical model:
˜˜ Di 5g Di 1g (i 2i )1h (5) t 1 t 2 t21 t21 t
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H0: g 51 (6) SC 1
Under the null (6), the serial correlation speciﬁcation holds true. Otherwise, the interest rate
3 smoothing conjecture is supported .
˜ About the Taylor rate i , we concentrate on its forward looking version popularized by Clarida et al. t
(2000, CGG henceforth).We do so because we believe that Central Banks tend to be forward looking
in setting their policy rates given that lags are present in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
CGG’s approach is captured by the following Taylor rate deﬁnition:
˜ ¯ i 5c 1bE p 1bE y (7) t p t21 t14 yt 21 t
¯ where c is a constant, p is the four-quarter average inﬂation rate, y is a measure of the gap, and E tt t 21
is the expectation operator conditional to the information available at time t21.
Rudebusch (2002) claims that the high estimated ﬁgures for the interest rate smoothing parameter r
might also be caused by serially correlated omitted variables. Which ones? Gerlach-Kristen (2002)
empirically shows that a measure of credit spread is statistically signiﬁcant in a backward looking
Taylor rule estimated with US data. This may be due to the fact that this spread is a good leading
indicator of the business cycle, as shown by Guha and Hiris (2002). Another variable we want to
consider is the squared value of the output gap, which can be related to Central Bankers’ asymmetric
4 preferences (Surico, 2002; Gerlach, 2000; Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2002) . To introduce the
omitted variable z in our analysis, we just add the term Ez to Eq. (7). tt 21 t
3   . The data
The variables employed in this exercise have been constructed as follows: p is the four-quarter t
inﬂation rate constructed on the basis of the GDP chainweighted price index P , i.e. p ;4(p 2p ), tt t t 21
* where p 5100 ln P . y is the output gap, which has been deﬁned as q 2q , where q ;100 ln Q , tt t tt t t
** * while q ;100 ln Q . Q is the real GDP level, while Q is the potential output estimated by the tt t t
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce. In Gerlach-Kristen (2002) paper, the credit spread is deﬁned as the
difference between the Moody’s BAA corporate index yield and the 10 year US treasury note yield.
We employ the same deﬁnition here. Finally, the upper-barred variables indicate simple averages
taken over the contemporaneous observation and the previous three lags of the variables considered.
All the series listed above are downloadable from the web-site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, i.e. http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
3We are here assuming that the federal funds rate has been driven either by a partial adjustment mechanism or by serially
correlated policy shocks. Indeed, we may think of a hybrid process, as well. However, the rejection of the null (6) would still
support the partial adjustment mechanism.
4See Surico (2002) for a detailed derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions of a problem with a general (i.e. Linex) loss
function and a New Keynesian structure of the economy.58 E. Castelnuovo / Economics Letters 81 (2003) 55–59
T  able 1
Test on partial adjustment vs. serial correlation
Forward looking Standard With spread With quadr. gap
Taylor rates
b 1.59** (0.49) 1.44** (0.28) 1.47** (0.43) p
b 0.70** (0.25) 0.79** (0.12) 0.43* (0.19) y
b – 22.98** (0.89) 20.30* (0.13) z
g 0.37* (0.17) 0.21** (0.07) 0.32 (0.19) 1
g 0.18** (0.06) 0.27** (0.04) 0.27** (0.08) 2
2 Adj. R 0.93 0.97 0.93
2 s 0.45 0.32 0.47 h
H0: g 51( F-stat, P-value) 0.001** 0.000** 0.001** SC 1
Sample, 1987:3Q1–2002:Q3. */**595%/99% statistical conﬁdence. t-Statistics (in brackets) corrected for heteroskedas-
2 ticity and serial correlation. Adj. R refers to the federal funds rate level. Constants omitted for brevity.
4   . The empirical model and results
By plugging Eq. (7) in (5) and taking into account the omitted variable Ez , we obtain the t21 t
following empirical model:
¯ Di 5g (bE Dp 1bE Dy 1bE Dz ) t 1 p t21 t11 yt 21 tz t 21 t
¯ 1g (c 1bE p 1bE y 1bE z 2i )1h (8) 2 p t21 t13 yt 21 t21 zt 21 t21 t21 t
5 We estimate the empirical model (8) with 2SLS .We use American data, and focus on Greenspan’s
regime, i.e. 1987:Q3–2002:Q3. Our estimates are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 reports P-values of the Wald-test on the null hypothesis (6). Notably, the null hypothesis is
rejected, thus discarding serial correlation as the unique reason for the observed policy rate
persistence. Hence, the data seem to suggest that the partial adjustment process is an important
element for tracking the federal funds rate path. This result is robust to the introduction of some
omitted variables in the Taylor rate. This ﬁnding supports the English et al. (2002) one. Notably, it is
based on a larger set of Taylor rates.
As a by product of our empirical test we also obtain estimates for the parameters of the Taylor rule
(7). Our ﬁgures are fairly in line with those in the literature. In particular, the Taylor principle (i.e.
b .1) seems to have been respected by Greenspan’s conduct, while the output gap coefﬁcient is p
positive and signiﬁcant. Interestingly enough, both the credit spread and the quadratic gap turns out to
be signiﬁcant and have the expected signs. We take these results as evidence in favor of a richer
speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule than the Standard one, at least for the US.
5 PPI PPI ¯¯ ¯¯ In all our regressions we exploit the following set of intruments: [c, p , ...,p , p , ...,p , y , ...,y , t22 t25 t22 t25 t22 t25
PPI ¯ i , ...,i ], where p is the four-quarter average inﬂation rate computed on the basis of the Producer Price Index t22 t25 t
(Finished Goods).E. Castelnuovo / Economics Letters 81 (2003) 55–59 59
5   . Conclusions
In this paper we employed the English et al. (2002) empirical model to test for the signiﬁcance of
interest rate smoothing at quarterly frequencies in simple Taylor rules. Our results suggest that the
estimated interest rate smoothing degree is not due to an omitted variable bias. Moreover, our
evidence indicates that ﬁnancial indicators and asymmetric preferences may have played a signiﬁcant
role in the determination of the monetary policy in the US.
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